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Chapter Six 
 
Crossing a Rubycon? The International 
Legal Framework for ISOs—Before and After 
Privatization 
 
 
Frans G. von der Dunk 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The present chapter analyzes the activities of international satellite organizations (ISOs), 
former ISOs, and private satellite operators from the perspective of the four principal in-
ternational space law treaties,1 consisting of the Outer Space Treaty,2 the Rescue and Re-
turn Agreement,3 the Liability Convention,4 and the Registration Convention.5 In addition, 
it considers a United Nations Resolution dealing specifically with Direct Broadcasting by 
Satellite,6 as it is one of the major categories of activities that international satellite organi-
zations such as INTELSAT and EUTELSAT have traditionally undertaken, as well as the 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU), which oversees the international regime 
developed to deal with frequency issues.7 
Analysis here will not deal with the general substance of these agreements, but only 
with the specifics they may provide for dealing with ISOs, as opposed to sovereign states, 
and ISOs now under private ownership. In particular, it will focus on the extent to which 
the transition from ISOs to supervisory IGOs-cum-private operators marks a watershed. 
While politically and economically this transition has often been characterized as a kind of 
“crossing of the Rubycon,” the question remains whether legally speaking that would be 
true as well. 
  
V O N  D E R  D U N K ,  C R O S S I N G  A  R U B Y C O N ?  (2 0 1 3 )  
2 
2. The Outer Space Treaty and Non-State Actors 
 
Turning to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and its establishment of a baseline legal regime for 
outer space activities including satellite communications, this Treaty very clearly distin-
guishes between state actors and non-state actors. The second category can then be further 
subdivided into intergovernmental organizations and private operators.8 It is by address-
ing the crossing of the boundary between those two subcategories that some light might 
be shed on the effects of the Treaty’s regime on the privatization process and vice versa, as 
well as on the way hybrid entities should be addressed from this perspective. The same 
general approach will also be followed with respect to the other treaties at issue, the afore-
mentioned UN Resolution and the legal regime developed in the context of the ITU. 
 
2.1. Intergovernmental Organizations and the Outer Space Treaty 
The focus of the present analysis is on the privatization of a handful of organizations which 
in their original versions, as will be seen, were clearly intergovernmental in nature: IN-
TELSAT,9 INMARSAT,10 and EUTELSAT.11 While to that extent the analysis of intergov-
ernmental organizations would also apply to such entities as INTERSPUTNIK12 and 
ARABSAT,13 the absence of full-fledged privatization in the latter two cases causes them 
to be absent from this analysis. Although INTERSPUTNIK has more recently moved to a 
construct similar to the original structure of INTELSAT, INMARSAT, and EUTELSAT, 
where the actual satellite operators conduct the day-to-day management of the system as 
opposed to the ruling body consisting of the states themselves, this level of “hybridization” 
would still not qualify INTERSPUTNIK as a private operator.14 
 
2.1.1. “Intergovernmental Organizations” 
By way of Articles VI and XIII, the Outer Space Treaty contains two relevant clauses spec-
ifying that its regime applies to international intergovernmental organizations (“IGOs,” 
which will be referred to as international satellite organizations or “ISOs,” wherever, in 
view of the focus of the present analysis, IGOs undertaking satellite communication activ-
ities are specifically addressed), meaning that non-governmental international organiza-
tions (“NGOs”) are not considered by those clauses.15 
Both clauses furthermore deal with specific consequences following from the fact that 
relevant activities are carried out with the crucial involvement of an international inter-
governmental organization. Interestingly, IGOs are viewed as mere platforms for individ-
ual states to cooperate, rather than as separate entities: the relevant cases are described as 
“where . . . [activities in the exploration and use of outer space] are carried on within the 
framework of international intergovernmental organisations.”16 This rather subordinated le-
gal status of IGOs is furthermore confirmed by the second paragraph, where “practical 
questions arising in connection with activities carried on by international intergovernmen-
tal organisations . . . shall be resolved by the States Parties to the Treaty either with the 
appropriate international organisation or with one or more States members of that inter-
national organisation, which are Parties to this Treaty.”17 
As such, states having a complaint about activities of an ISO are always entitled to refer 
to one or more of the member states of the latter, in case they do not wish to deal with the 
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ISO itself. This absence of a measure of true legal independence for ISOs in the interna-
tional community of space actors is largely the result of reluctance on the part of the Soviet 
Union at the time to grant IGOs such independent legal personality, and its insistence on 
“classical” state sovereignty as the lynchpin for dealing with any legal issues pertinent to 
outer space.18 
The same limited status for ISOs emanates from the other key article here, Article VI, 
which provides: “When activities are carried on in outer space . . . by an international or-
ganisation, responsibility for compliance with this Treaty shall be borne both by the inter-
national organisation and by the States Parties to the Treaty participating in such 
organisation.”19 Responsibility of an IGO without the possibility to refer (also) to its indi-
vidual member states, apparently, was not a feasible option. 
In other words, the concept of an IGO, whether involved in satellite communications or 
in other space activities, is clearly delineated, if not indeed defined, by its having sovereign 
states as members. This conforms of course to the general public international law concept 
of an IGO.20 As a consequence of such membership and the essentially public character of 
its tasks, responsibilities, and activities, IGOs have an institutionalized system for partici-
pation of member state representatives,21 may be granted secondary competencies to conclude 
international agreements of a treaty-like nature,22 and enjoy certain functional immunities 
and privileges based on those of sovereign states and their diplomatic representations.23 
Thus, in spite of their hybrid character (Public Telecommunication Operators and pri-
vate operators, such as COMSAT or KDD, as signatories to the underlying operating agree-
ments being in charge of the day-to-day running of the organization as well as providing 
for the financing and the revenue-sharing mechanism), prior to their privatization INTEL-
SAT, INMARSAT, and EUTELSAT were undoubtedly IGOs in the sense of the aforemen-
tioned Articles VI and XIII of the Outer Space Treaty. These ISOs were all composed of 
member states which were represented in the ultimate ruling body, and under whose con-
trol also the members of the chief governing body, consisting of representatives of the “sig-
natories,” were designated.24 Also, they had Headquarters Agreements and related 
Protocols on privileges and immunities in place with their respective host states: INTEL-
SAT with the United States,25 INMARSAT with the United Kingdom,26 and EUTELSAT 
with France.27 
 
2.1.2. The ISOs Post-Privatization 
The privatization process did not result in the complete elimination of IGO structures: IN-
TELSAT as an ISO was replaced by the International Telecommunication Satellite Organi-
zation or ITSO,28 INMARSAT by the International Mobile Satellite Organization or IMSO,29 
and EUTELSAT by EUTELSAT IGO.30 ITSO, IMSO, and EUTELSAT IGO are still com-
posed of member states as the ultimate bearers of competence to determine the legal struc-
ture, role, and personality of the organizations;31 and as such still undoubtedly qualify as 
IGOs. These three residual organizations continue to enjoy functional privileges and im-
munities, especially in their respective host states of the United States, the United King-
dom, and France.32 
In fact, it is merely the scope of tasks and competencies of these ISOs which has been 
greatly reduced when compared to their predecessors. With a view to the application of 
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the Outer Space Treaty, however, this does raise the question of whether these new IGOs 
are still materially impacted by the regime of the Outer Space Treaty, since Article VI 
thereof is concerned with “activities in outer space” and Article XIII with “activities in the 
use or exploration of outer space.” 
ITSO’s main purpose is now simply “to ensure, through the Public Services Agreement 
(PSA), that the Company provides, on a commercial basis, international public telecommuni-
cations services, in order to ensure performance of the Core Principles.”33 Article V of the 
ITSO Agreement further defines that purpose as “supervision,” imposing a general obli-
gation that “ITSO shall take all appropriate actions” to that end. Similarly, IMSO is “to 
ensure that the basic principles set forth in this Article shall be observed by the Company,”34 
and as for EUTELSAT IGO, “the primary purpose of EUTELSAT is to ensure that the Basic 
Principles set forth in this Article are observed by the Company Eutelsat S.A.”35 These are all, 
clearly, not “activities in outer space” in the sense of Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty. 
By contrast, and as a consequence, in the case of ITSO “the international telecommuni-
cations satellite organization’s space system is transferred” to Intelsat,36 in the case of IMSO 
it is Inmarsat which will henceforth operate the satellite system,37 whereas in the case of 
EUTELSAT IGO, “Eutelsat S.A. will be established to operate a satellite system and to provide 
satellite services and for this purpose, EUTELSAT’s assets and operational activities will be 
transferred to the Company Eutelsat S.A.”38 
 
2.2. Private Operators and the Outer Space Treaty 
While the Outer Space Treaty does not use the term “private,” essentially because of the 
aforementioned political issues the Soviet Union had with acknowledging legal personal-
ity of any other entities than states, it does without doubt encompass private actors in outer 
space such as operators of telecommunication satellites in the broader term “non-govern-
mental entities” of Article VI,39 as well as in the term “nationals” of Article IX.40 
 
2.2.1. “Authorization and Continuing Supervision” 
Article VI provides for the main requirement applicable here to private satellite communi-
cation operators with the clause stating that “the activities of non-governmental entities in 
outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall require authorisation and 
continuing supervision by the appropriate State Party to the Treaty.” This clause is widely 
perceived to provide the most fundamental basis for national space laws and/or licensing 
systems for private space activities,41 noting at the same time that the precise definition of 
“the appropriate state” is still subject to discussion.42 Several authors in addition have 
claimed that, without such proper authorization and continuing supervision, private ac-
tivities in space would actually be prohibited, as far as international space law is con-
cerned, since Article I of the Outer Space Treaty expressly limits the freedom to explore 
and use outer space to states.43 
At the same time, Article VI determines that the state(s) whose national activities are 
concerned would remain responsible in any event, effectively comprising such activities if 
conducted by non-governmental entities on the same footing.44 Thus, in case those activi-
ties would transgress the boundaries set by international (space) law, the state(s) con-
cerned would have to be addressed for repairing such an internationally wrongful act 
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regardless of whether and to what extent such authorization and supervision had been 
provided. This, obviously, would include private operators of satellite systems for com-
munication purposes.45 
Furthermore, it has been a comprehensive and uniform general practice for states not 
to question whether private activities in outer space conducted by operators within the 
jurisdiction of other states have actually been licensed by those states, nor is there any in-
ternational custom of international public notification of granting such licenses. The result-
ing general absence of protests from states to cases where other states might have allowed 
such private activities to go ahead without any specific license or authorization constitutes 
a major argument for concluding that non-authorized and/or non-supervised activities do 
not violate any rule of space law by the mere fact of such lack of authorization and/or 
supervision.46 
Indeed, it would seem impractical for other states to merely call a state to account for 
not having (properly) authorized and/or continuously supervised certain private space ac-
tivities if such space activities would not actually have violated substantive obligations 
under space law. Hence, the more appropriate view would seem to be that the freedom for 
states to explore and use outer space subsumes the corresponding freedom for their private 
entities, even if not authorized and supervised; but under no circumstance would such an 
absence of authorization and supervision detract from the state’s responsibility for the pri-
vate space activities at issue, and actually would enlarge the extent of the violation of rel-
evant treaty obligations.47 The absence of specific authorization and/or supervision from 
such a perspective could be read as a blank approval by the state to conduct the activities 
concerned, since it will be held responsible regardless; it (presumably knowingly) accepts 
the risk that its responsibility will be invoked, yet has not chosen to develop and/or apply 
any specific authorization and/or supervision regime. 
It is once such activities come to be in violation of material rules of international (space) 
law that states concerned would invoke the responsibility of the relevant other state(s) in 
order to see the violation stopped and/or reparation provided. This key principle of inter-
national state responsibility goes back to the famous Chorzow Factory case of 1928, where 
the Permanent Court of International Justice stated that the fundamental legal consequence 
of state responsibility for an international wrongful act would be an obligation for the re-
sponsible state to provide for “reparation,” such reparation usually taking the form of ei-
ther restitutio in integrum, compensation (usually in case only of material harm) and/or 
satisfaction.48 
 
2.2.2. ‘‘National Activities (in Outer Space)” 
The other major issue debated in the context of Article VI and its application to private 
actors concerns the scope of the concept of “national activities (in outer space).” Without 
detailing the many discussions on the topic and the many definitions or circumscriptions 
offered,49 the current status as regards the definition of “national activities” lacks clarity on 
the international level. This leads those states that find themselves compelled to implement 
the authorization and supervision clauses of Article VI by means of national laws and/or 
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licensing systems to follow their own preference in applying such laws or systems to na-
tionals (including companies with their respective nationality) and/or to anyone operating 
from their territory, and/or through still other channels for exercising jurisdiction.50 
Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty refers to the more limited context where states are 
aware “that an activity or experiment planned by it or its nationals in outer space . . . would 
cause potentially harmful interference with activities of other States Parties in the peaceful 
exploration and use of outer space,” in which case such states “shall undertake appropriate 
international consultations before proceeding with any such activity or experiment.” In 
other words, a specific obligation for states to consult with other states in certain scenarios 
involving their respective national companies (including in cases of satellite communica-
tion activities) is added to the all-encompassing obligation to be held accountable for the 
activities of those companies in case of transgressing the boundaries imposed by interna-
tional (space) law in this respect. 
 
2.2.3. The Private Character of Intelsat, Inmarsat, and Eutelsat and Their Licensing 
There can be no doubt that Intelsat, Inmarsat, and Eutelsat are private companies. They do 
not have a membership of sovereign states but are principally owned by shareholders 
(among which may be found some public authorities, but in an essentially private capac-
ity), and they do not enjoy any of the financing or immunity-related privileges that IGOs 
can enjoy.51 This means they are to be authorized and supervised, as far as Article VI is 
concerned, by “the appropriate State,” and under Article IX by the state whose “national-
ity” they carry (which under general international law used to refer to the state where the 
private operator is incorporated and headquartered).52 Since in all three cases the state of 
registration is identical to the state of headquartering, Intelsat (headquartered in Washing-
ton at least for its administrative and operational purposes, as was the old INTELSAT) 
qualifies as a US company, Inmarsat (headquartered in London, as was the old INMAR-
SAT) as a British one, and Eutelsat (headquartered in Paris, as was the old EUTELSAT) as 
a French one.53 With respect to Intelsat, it should be added that essentially it was the ad-
ministrative headquarters, including the satellite operational control functions, which re-
mained in the United States,54 as the formal incorporation of the holding company has 
recently moved to Luxembourg from Bermuda, a UK dependency where it was originally 
established. 
The United States thus applies its Communications Act of 1934,55 as amended by the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, as the national act providing for authorization and su-
pervision in the sense of Article VI, to Intelsat. The Act provides for a licensing obligation 
of all persons using or operating “any apparatus for the transmission of . . . communica-
tions or signal by radio” from within the territorial or quasi-territorial jurisdiction of the 
United States.56 The Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the US government 
agency which authorizes and supervises US communications activities and operators, spe-
cifically declared in 1970 that the Communications Act was applicable to satellite commu-
nications.57 
With reference to the two other countries formally involved in Intelsat, it should be 
pointed out that Luxembourg, the country of formal incorporation of the parent holding 
company,58 does not have a national space law yet, which essentially makes application of 
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US national law as per the above undisputed. In the case of the United Kingdom, which 
does have its Outer Space Act,59 there are no actual satellites deployed at the orbital loca-
tions and operating in the frequency assignments for which the United Kingdom serves as 
the Notifying Administration at this time, leaving any potential role for the United King-
dom in this regard in a relatively passive state.60 
In the case of Inmarsat, the United Kingdom does require Inmarsat to hold a license 
under the UK Outer Space Act, as it obliges any UK operator procuring the launch of a 
satellite, operating it or conducting any other activity in outer space to obtain a license in 
accordance with its terms.61 In addition, in view of the telecommunication activities con-
ducted by its space system, Inmarsat is also required to comply with any relevant require-
ments under the UK Telecommunications Act; the mere existence of a license under the 
Outer Space Act does not take away such a requirement.62 
As for France, the privatization or restructuring of EUTELSAT, resulting in the estab-
lishment of the French company Eutelsat S.A., presented a major reason for recently enun-
ciating a national space law where none had existed before.63 The new Act obliges Eutelsat 
to hold a French license, as it requires “any . . . juridical person carrying out a space oper-
ation” (which includes “ensuring the commanding of a space object during its journey in 
outer space”), if such operator is of French nationality, to be authorized by the French au-
thorities under the Law.64 
 
2.3. The “Boundary” Issue under the Outer Space Treaty 
From the above analysis, the essential boundary between application of the Outer Space 
Treaty to ISOs and such application to private companies becomes clearly visible. The main 
difference between the two categories under the Treaty itself, it may be noted, consists in 
the requirements of authorization and continuing supervision under Article VI and of con-
sultation in cases of potentially hazardous activities under Article IX as far as the latter is 
concerned, although this may be more of a formal distinction. ISOs in practice will operate 
under some system of authorization and possibly also supervision by their member 
states—only, in this case, through their governing multilateral treaties and statutes instead 
of through a single-state licensing process. Similarly, Articles VI and XIII jointly make clear 
that states are also required to consult in appropriate cases targeted by Article IX since 
ISOs are principally viewed as “frameworks” for state activities, not as independent actors 
whose responsibilities are separate or to be separated from those of their member states. 
In any privatization process, as far as such a formal distinction goes, the Rubycon is 
crossed the moment the entities in question no longer consist of member states.65 At that 
point in time, they come to fall under a single state’s international responsibility as op-
posed to the joint responsibility of the member states—in the case of Intelsat, the United 
States; Inmarsat, the United Kingdom; and Eutelsat, France. 
This single-state responsibility arises notwithstanding the continuing existence of ITSO, 
IMSO, and EUTELSAT IGO respectively and their exercise of legally entrenched control 
and supervision activities over the three now private companies, as such control and su-
pervision remain limited to a few explicitly delineated public interest aspects. 
Thus, ITSO can “take all appropriate actions, including entering into the Public Services 
Agreement, to supervise the performance by the Company of the Core Principles;” the 
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legally binding PSA with the company being the principal instrument for ITSO to make 
sure Intelsat will provide its services with “global connectivity and global coverage,” con-
tinue to “serve its lifeline connectivity customers” and “provide non-discriminatory access 
to” Intelsat’s satellite capacity.66 Interestingly, at least for the first twelve years since pri-
vatization was realized the costs involved in running ITSO will be met “by the retention 
of certain financial assets at the time of transfer of ITSO’s space system to the Company.”67 
IMSO likewise has a Public Service Agreement in force with Inmarsat, spelling out the 
details of the obligations of the latter subject to supervision and control by the former.68 
The IMSO Assembly consequently is entitled “to take any steps or procedures necessary 
to ensure observance by the Company of the basic principles, as provided for in Article 4, 
including approval of the conclusion, modification and termination of the Public Services 
Agreement under Article 4(1).”69 These basic principles oblige Inmarsat to ensure the con-
tinued provision of global maritime distress and safety satellite communications services, 
to provide services without discrimination on the basis of nationality, to act exclusively for 
peaceful purposes, to serve—at least in principle—all areas where there is a need for mo-
bile satellite communications, giving due consideration to the rural and the remote areas 
of developing countries, and to operate in a manner consistent with fair competition.70 Also 
IMSO is essentially funded by the company it is charged to supervise and control, at least 
to the extent of costs concerning the “establishment and operation of the Secretariat; the 
holding of Assembly sessions; and the implementation of any measures taken by the Or-
ganisation in accordance with Article 4 to ensure that the Company observes the basic 
principles.”71 
Finally, EUTELSAT IGO once again has largely followed the path of ITSO, although 
here the Public Services Agreement has been labeled “Arrangement,” defined as “the Ar-
rangement between EUTELSAT and the Company Eutelsat S.A. having as its purposes to 
define the relationship between EUTELSAT and the Company Eutelsat S.A. and their re-
spective obligations and in particular to provide the framework that will enable EUTEL-
SAT to oversee and ensure the observance by the Company Eutelsat S.A. of the Basic 
Principles.”72 These Basic Principles pertain to universal service obligations, pan-European 
coverage by the satellite system, nondiscrimination, fair competition, and due adherence 
to rights and obligations under international law such as the ITU Radio Regulations for the 
use of frequencies deriving from the operation of the space segment transferred from EU-
TELSAT IGO to Eutelsat.73 EUTELSAT’s main organ, the Assembly of Parties, conse-
quently has the mandate inter alia “to consider and to review the activities of the Company 
Eutelsat S.A. which relate to the Basic Principles,” “to ensure observance by the Company 
Eutelsat S.A. of the Basic Principles, in accordance with the Arrangement” and “to take the 
appropriate decisions in order to ensure continuity regarding rights and obligations under 
international law” as referred to before.74 Also in the European context, the company basi-
cally has to pay: “The costs incurred in establishing and operating the Secretariat, includ-
ing, but not limited to rent and associated costs of maintaining office premises, salaries and 
emoluments of staff, costs of organising and holding meetings of the Assembly of Parties, 
the costs of consultations between EUTELSAT and the Parties and other organisations and 
costs of applying measures taken by EUTELSAT under Article III to ensure that the Basic 
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Principles are observed by the Company Eutelsat S.A. shall be borne by the Company Eu-
telsat S.A. in accordance with paragraph a) of Article V, within the relevant ceilings set 
forth in the Arrangement.”75 
Thus, it may be concluded that in each case crossing the Rubycon toward privatization 
has resulted in the new operators now being subjected to formalized and explicit require-
ments as to their key international public duties, accompanied by substantial legal and 
jurisdictional tools for the revamped IGOs to ensure conformity with those requirements. 
By contrast, in the context of the ISOs prior to privatization such public duties were con-
sidered to be sufficiently guaranteed by the control of the totality of their member states 
through the governing bodies. 
The explicit character of those public duties and the need to preserve them in a privat-
ized environment may well turn out to be an interesting development not only in the specific 
context of those respective IGOs and former ISOs but also for the broader development of 
international space law, if only because the conflicts between commercial interests and 
general public interests are now more likely to lead to proper legal disputes requiring legal 
solutions, as opposed to being dealt with at an international political (member state) level. 
At the same time it should be reiterated that the United States, the United Kingdom, 
and France remain the primary addressees of any question of legality of the operations of 
Intelsat, Inmarsat, and Eutelsat respectively. Beyond the core public duties addressed in 
the Public Service Agreements—which essentially concern entitlements for (certain) mem-
ber states of ITSO, IMSO, and EUTELSAT IGO—these three states will be held accountable 
by third-party states. Here also any such disputes would more readily be handled in 
proper legal terms in view of the applicable domestic regimes of authorization and contin-
uing supervision, including national space law. 
 
3. The Rescue Agreement and Non-State Actors 
 
3.1. Intergovernmental Organizations and the Rescue Agreement 
Where the Outer Space Treaty specifically mentioned intergovernmental organizations yet 
did not acknowledge or grant them any substantive measure of independent legal person-
ality, in elaborating Articles V and VIII thereof76 the Rescue Agreement went one step fur-
ther with a view to IGOs. It provided namely that “for the purposes of this Agreement, the 
term ‘launching authority’ shall refer to . . . , where an international intergovernmental 
organisation is responsible for launching, that organisation,” if three further conditions 
would be fulfilled:77 (1) the majority of the IGO’s member states being parties to the Outer 
Space Treaty; ( 2) the majority of the IGO’s member states being parties themselves to the 
Rescue Agreement; and (3) the IGO issuing a formal declaration of “its acceptance of the 
rights and obligations provided for in this Agreement.”78 Since the concept of the “launch-
ing authority” pointed to the entity principally enjoying the rights proffered by the Agree-
ment,79 this clause essentially allowed ISOs to become, to a considerable extent, equated to 
states for the purpose of the Agreement’s regime. 
Neither INTELSAT, nor INMARSAT, nor EUTELSAT, however, have issued such a dec-
laration;80 in any case where these ISOs would have been interested in recovering a satellite 
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they would have had to call upon one or more of their member states, or through the con-
tract with the launching authority upon such authority, to ensure these interests were be-
ing recognized and respected. This situation has persisted with ITSO, IMSO, and 
EUTELSAT IGO after the privatization of the operators was finalized, although the lack of 
direct involvement of these IGOs with the satellites and satellite operations themselves 
makes this a rather theoretical point.81 It would be hard to derive from the roles of ITSO, 
IMSO, and EUTELSAT IGO a status of “launching authority,” which after all is defined as 
being “responsible for launching” of the satellite at issue.82 As following from earlier anal-
ysis, ITSO, IMSO, and EUTELSAT IGO now act in a purely reactive mode to decisions on 
launching and operating satellites that are made by Intelsat, Inmarsat, and Eutelsat—and 
then only to the limited extent of ascertaining their compliance with certain international 
public duties. 
Finally it should be noted that the equation of IGOs to states for the purpose of the 
Rescue Agreement is limited to the substantial obligations related to (rescue and) recovery 
of astronauts and spacecraft; the concept of the “launching authority” does not play a role 
in the context of any procedural issues such as the possibilities to amend the Rescue Agree-
ment.83 
 
3.2. Private Operators and the Rescue Agreement 
Contrary to the Outer Space Treaty, the Rescue Agreement does not make any reference to 
private parties, not even under a broad concept of “nongovernmental entities.” In addition 
to the general lack of perception that private enterprise might be interested in space activ-
ities and the political resistance of the former Soviet Union to legal recognition of private 
space activities, the absence of any reference to private parties was also due to the focus of 
the Agreement on manned spaceflight and assistance to astronauts, where such participa-
tion was expected least of all.84 
For private operators, this means that relevant legal rights and obligations are com-
pletely subsumed under those of the contracting state concerned as “launching authority,” 
consistent with the general approach on this set forth in particular in Article VI of the Outer 
Space Treaty.85 In addition, the Rescue Agreement has been argued above to essentially 
constitute an elaboration of two specific Articles of the Outer Space Treaty. 
As a consequence, on the side of claiming rights under the Agreement, the state(s) qual-
ifying as the launching authority(ies) for a telecommunication satellite would have to take 
up the cause of the private operator in case the latter is seeking, for example, for return 
and recovery of its satellite. For Intelsat, at least the United States would be such a “launch-
ing authority” and “contracting party,” for Inmarsat the United Kingdom and for Eutelsat 
France. 
In addition, however, possibly one or more other states might also qualify as “launching 
authority.” Take the example where Intelsat would choose to launch one of its satellites 
from Bajkonour, a Russian facility located on the territory of Kazakhstan. The concept of 
the “launching authority” has not been defined by the Rescue Agreement beyond the state 
or IGO “responsible for launching.”86 Noting however that most experts tend to blend the 
notion of “launching authority” with the later one of the “launching state,” which has been 
defined by the Liability and Registration Conventions in greater detail,87 any launch from 
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Bajkonour would make both Russia and Kazakhstan launching states and therefore might 
also qualify them as launching authorities for the purpose of the Rescue Agreement. 
The only problem here would be that the Rescue Agreement throughout refers to the 
concept of “launching authority” explicitly in the singular . With, in the example given, the 
United States, Russia, and Kazakhstan effectively all sharing the “responsibility” for the 
launch, under a strict interpretation the question would arise which state would be the 
“most responsible” one so as to most logically qualify as the launching authority.88 Or 
should the explicit singularity of the “launching authority” be considered effectively over-
ridden, outdated by later developments regarding the possible plurality of the “launching 
state” under the Liability and Registration Conventions?89 
On the other hand, for those private operators that would find themselves confronted 
with complaints emanating from obligations following from the Rescue Agreement, the 
launching authority would be the relevant contracting party to the Agreement to defend 
against legal claims, although this would be largely theoretical. Private operators would 
not likely become involved in scenarios where they would be able to play a substantial role 
in “rescuing” or returning a satellite. At best, it could be imagined that a satellite operator 
would be the first to receive or discover “information . . . that the personnel of a spacecraft 
have alighted on the high seas or in any other place not under the jurisdiction of any State,” 
triggering the relevant obligations for the contracting party.90 
In such cases, it would seem to be exclusively the United States in respect of Intelsat, the 
United Kingdom in respect of Inmarsat, and France in respect of Eutelsat which would be 
held to answer such claims, although it could not be excluded that, for example, the oper-
ation of a particular Inmarsat satellite conducted from US territory might trigger US re-
sponsibility in addition to that of the United Kingdom. The concept of “national activities” 
determines the scope of the international responsibility addressed by Article VI of the 
Outer Space Treaty, and such “national activities” could very well encompass, next to ac-
tivities conducted by nationals of the state concerned (the United Kingdom in the case of 
Inmarsat), activities conducted from the territory of another state concerned (in this exam-
ple the United States).91 
 
3.3. The “Boundary” Issue Under the Rescue Agreement 
In the absence of any reference to private operators or non-governmental entities and with 
“international intergovernmental organisations” for the purposes of the Agreement de-
fined in no greater detail than precisely by the reference to “intergovernmental,” the cru-
cial dividing line between IGO/ISO and private operator remains the same as that 
discussed with respect to the Outer Space Treaty.92 INTELSAT, ITSO, INMARSAT, IMSO, 
EUTELSAT, and EUTELSAT IGO thus all respectively qualify as IGOs for the purpose of 
the Rescue Agreement, whereas Intelsat, Inmarsat, and Eutelsat clearly do not. 
The main result of the privatization process in this context then is that the actual opera-
tors of the three satellite systems since being privatized can no longer claim rights of re-
covery and return directly even in theory, as dependent upon a relevant declaration under 
Article 6, but now in any case would require their respective launching authority (or 
launching authorities) to do so. 
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In addition, they would not be held directly responsible under international space law 
for any possible violations of the relevant obligations, in this case referring to issues of 
rescue, recovery, and return. However, as discussed above, when it comes to possible vio-
lations of any rules of space law under the Outer Space Treaty, in the case of an ISO there 
would always be a residual responsibility for those states members of the ISO, so that the 
difference in that respect would not be very substantial. 
 
4. The Liability Convention and Non-State Actors 
 
4.1. Intergovernmental Organizations and the Liability Convention 
The Liability Convention is generally perceived to constitute an elaboration of Article VII 
of the Outer Space Treaty, establishing a more detailed set of liability rules based upon the 
fundamental principle of liability created by it.93 The Convention specifically refers to “in-
ternational intergovernmental organizations” in just two of its clauses: one on the specific 
issue of definition of damage compensable under the Convention,94 the other having a fun-
damental effect on the scope of the Convention ratione materiae rather akin to the formula 
of Article 6 of the Rescue Agreement. 
 
4.1.1. The secondary Status of IGOs under the Convention 
As to the latter, Article XXII(1) of the Liability Convention provides: “In this Convention, 
with the exception of Articles XXIV to XXVII, references to States shall be deemed to apply 
to any international intergovernmental organisation which conducts space activities if the 
organisation declares its acceptance of the rights and obligations provided for in this Con-
vention and if a majority of the States members of the organisation are States Parties to this 
Convention and to the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Explo-
ration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.” Member 
states of an IGO, furthermore, are charged specifically with trying to get that IGO to make 
such a declaration.95 
The Convention thus requires the same three conditions to be fulfilled as in the case of 
the Rescue Agreement. Further, like the Rescue Agreement, the “partisanship” of an IGO 
in its own right is limited to the substantive rights and obligations, where Articles XIV 
through XX deal with the Claims Commission as the dispute settlement mechanism of-
fered by the Convention to states parties. Article XXI deals with the possible need to render 
assistance in case of large scale dangers to human life and Articles XXIII through XXVIII 
deal with procedural issues and formalities.96 
More clearly than in the Rescue Agreement, however, the legal personality potentially 
granted to ISOs is of a secondary nature. When the ISO in its quality of “launching state”97 
has become liable for damage caused by its space object, any claim for such damage should 
be addressed firstly to the organization itself, yet in a second instance, “where the organi-
sation has not paid, within a period of six months, any sum agreed or determined to be 
due as compensation for such damage, . . . the claimant State [may] invoke the liability of 
the members which are States Parties to this Convention for the payment of that sum.”98 
Six months, however, is not a terribly long period for an ISO to deal with an international 
liability claim under the Liability Convention. 
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In other words: behind the “surface” liability of an ISO there would always lie a “base-
line” liability of the individual member states; such states can never use the ISO as a shield 
against any obligation to see the victim duly compensated and would be instead be incen-
tivized to arrange for a proper handling of such claims in the context of the IGO prior to 
such event.99 Such arrangements would have to deal most importantly with questions (1) 
regarding contributions to any liability claim to be paid by an ISO by those of its member 
states not parties to the Liability Convention (and hence to that extent not under a self-
evident obligation to carry their share of the ISO’s liability), and (2) whether the propor-
tionality criterion to be used for such cases should refer to the overall respective contribu-
tions made to the ISO, the respective contributions made to the particular satellite, a 
general calculation of GNP or any combination of those and/or other criteria. Thus, if the 
ISO is unable to pay the claim directly, the victim could still seek compensation from the 
member state. 
On the other hand, if an ISO would become the victim of damage compensable under 
the Convention, its legal status is even more secondary, as “any claim, pursuant to the 
provisions of this Convention, for compensation in respect of damage caused to an organ-
isation which has made a declaration in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article shall 
be presented by a State member of the organization which is a State Party to this Conven-
tion.’’100 
Clearly, an ISO is not an autonomous entity whose intergovernmental composition is 
irrelevant, presenting a public version of a “corporate veil” hiding the individual interests 
of the “shareholders.”101 As seen before in the context of Articles VI and XIII of the Outer 
Space Treaty, the ISO in such cases is considered in essence to be a vehicle for a number of 
states to act collectively, stimulating states to use it also as a vehicle for dealing with joint 
liabilities for the activities of the ISO. 
 
4.1.2. The Special Case of EUTELSAT IGO 
Among the three original ISOs which are the object of current analysis, EUTELSAT is the 
only one to have actually declared its acceptance of rights and obligations under the Lia-
bility Convention by means of a relevant declaration.102 While that declaration may persist 
also with respect to the EUTELSAT IGO which took the place of the old “EUTELSAT,”103 
it remains to be seen what this means in light of the fact that any space operations of note—
the kind of activities potentially triggering application of the Liability Convention—have 
been transferred to Eutelsat in the course of the privatization process. 
On the “defendant-side,” with a view to the definition of the “launching State,” applica-
bility of the Convention could only become an issue to the extent that EUTELSAT IGO 
would itself “procure” the launch of another satellite on behalf of Eutelsat.104 Such a situa-
tion, however, would now be highly unlikely, as the main legislative efforts driving pri-
vatization of the ISOs called for operational independence of the private operator from the 
supervising public entity. For Europe, the 1994 EU Satellite Directive required full-fledged 
privatization of the ISOs inter alia through deletion of any special or exclusive rights, state 
aids of any sorts as well as other benefits IGOs could derive from such a status.105 Likewise, 
for the United States the 2000 ORBIT Act106 required privatization to be comprehensive in 
order to allow fair competition of the privatized former ISOs with private operators that 
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did not evolve from ISOs, such as PanAmSat, which had lobbied vehemently with the US 
government to get it to ensure a level playing field in those respects.107 
On the “claimant-side,” EUTELSAT IGO by its declaration would still qualify as an IGO 
entitled under Article XXII of the Convention to the rights and duties of states under the 
Convention, but, as discussed, for assertion of a claim for compensation of damage suf-
fered, it would depend upon a member state. The sole difference being that, were EUTEL-
SAT IGO to be treated as the entity itself suffering damage (namely “through” the private 
operator it is monitoring following the privatization of the operations, as if by proxy), any 
EUTELSAT IGO member state could be called upon to assert a claim on behalf of Eutelsat. 
However, if such damage could not be legally constructed so as to give rise to implemen-
tation of the EUTELSAT declaration, only France (as the state of nationality of Eutelsat) 
would be entitled to put forward such a claim. 
 
4.2. Private Operators and the Liability Convention 
Like the two other space treaties discussed so far, the Liability Convention does not spe-
cifically refer to private enterprise, although it does make reference to “juridical persons” 
a few times in the context of defining compensable damage under the Liability Conven-
tion.108 
 
4.2.1. The Proper Place of Private Operators under the Convention 
On the “liability-side,” as a consequence of the four criteria to become a liable entity de-
fined as “launching State” (every “State which launches or procures the launching of a 
space object . . . [or] from whose territory or facility a space object is launched” qualifies as 
a “launching State,” and hence is liable for damage caused by the space object concerned 
under the Convention)109 no measure of private involvement in the space object concerned, 
whether it concerns its manufacture, its launch, its ownership, its operation, or its usage, 
is relevant at the international level. Regardless of such private involvement, a particular 
state will be held liable under the Liability Convention once it qualifies as a launching state, 
and whether and to what extent it would be able to have recourse to any private entity 
involved is not a matter of the Convention itself, or for general international law for that 
matter. 
The Liability Convention, in contrast to the Rescue Agreement and its concept of “launch-
ing authority” as discussed before, allows for multiple states to qualify as a “launching 
state,” and specifically establishes joint and several liability in cases where more than one 
state qualifies as such.110 Thus, if Intelsat were to launch a satellite from Bajkonour, the 
United States as well as Russia and Kazakhstan would qualify as launching states. The 
resulting joint and several liability is a matter for the states concerned to deal with. For 
example, Russia and Kazakhstan have concluded an ongoing agreement that any liability 
claims addressed at Kazakhstan as a consequence of Bajkonour-launches will be reim-
bursed by Russia.111 This bilateral inter-party arrangement, however, clearly cannot dero-
gate from the liability as such of Kazakhstan under the Liability Convention. 
The issue of reimbursement by the private operator, the de facto “causator” of the dam-
age (as well as the establishment of other means of legal control over, and involvement 
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with, such private participation) as a consequence of the definition of the liable entity (en-
tities) through the concept of the “launching state” becomes a matter of domestic action. 
Notably, this would take the form of the drafting of national space legislation or national 
licenses providing for a reimbursement obligation, and—if considered requisite—attendant 
obligations of financial security, insurance, technical, and operational expertise, and ap-
propriate other measures to limit the opportunities that damage would actually be caused. 
And indeed, in a number of instances individual states have taken care to oblige satellite 
operators (as well as other private companies active in outer space so as to run the risk of 
causing damage compensable under the Liability Convention) (1) to take out a license be-
fore being allowed to commence or continue their activities; ( 2) to accept in such a license 
the obligation to reimburse the licensing state for claims the latter might have to pay out 
under the Liability Convention, either without or up to a limit; and (3) to insure, at least 
up to a certain amount, against such a reimbursement obligation.112 
The Liability Convention, however, by its approach to handling liability, gives rise to a 
peculiar situation here: essentially it is not a space activity causing damage in a particular 
case which leads to the liable entity or entities, but the space object involved in that activity, 
where the launch then points to the liable entity or entities.113 That complete focus on the 
launch, however, and on the state(s) crucially involved therein as per the fourfold criterion, 
essentially means “once a launching state, always a liable state.”114 In turn, in domestic 
legal mechanisms devised to handle such liability in cases of private involvement, the fo-
cus will be largely on such involvement in the launch, as opposed to, for instance, the sat-
ellite operations themselves. 
 
4.2.2. Private Operators (Such as Intelsat) and US National Space Law 
This is most clear in the US case, relevant to Intelsat, as the United States has different 
licensing regimes for private involvement in launching (and other forms of space transpor-
tation), satellite communications,115 and satellite remote sensing,116 respectively, whereas the 
regime providing for liability-reimbursement and related insurance obligations is incorpo-
rated exclusively in the first-mentioned regime. 
Here, the Commercial Space Launch Act Amendments of 1988, now codified in their 
latest rendition as part of the United States Code,117 provided that anyone licensed under 
the Act “shall obtain liability insurance or demonstrate financial responsibility in amounts 
to compensate for the maximum probable loss from claims by . . . a third party for death, 
bodily injury, or property damage or loss resulting from an activity carried out under the 
license.”118 That insurance is to cover inter alia the US government against such claims as 
may arise under the Liability Convention.119 The “maximum probable loss” referred to in 
this key clause is to be determined by the Secretary of Transportation (read the Office of 
the Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation as mandated by the for-
mer), but any possible amount to be derogated under this concept would be capped by 
either “the maximum liability insurance available on the world market at reasonable cost” 
or US$500,000,000, whichever is the lower.120 
Most importantly, however, the particular licensing obligation entailing such further 
responsibilities applies only to anyone wishing “to launch a launch vehicle or to operate a 
launch site . . . in the United States,” as well as any “citizen of the United States . . . [wishing] 
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to launch a launch vehicle or to operate a launch site . . . outside the United States”—not, for 
example, to someone only operating the satellite launched and/or having ordered such 
launch.121 
Any private satellite operator, even if a US company in legal terms (like Intelsat) and 
operating its satellites from US soil (as Intelsat at least partially does), would at best come 
in touch with these rules indirectly. This would occur namely only to the extent it would 
have its satellites launched by an operator that is subject to the above licensing require-
ments, and may wish to derogate, as part of the launch contract, (part of) those liabilities 
to the satellite operator. Most likely, relevant provisions would focus on damage caused 
as a consequence of negligence or gross negligence on the part of the launch provider al-
ternatively satellite operator, noting that the baseline standard of practice in such contracts 
is a cross-waiver of liability, or on cases where the damage was caused unequivocally after 
the launch phase had ended and the satellite was on its own. Ultimately, however, what-
ever provisions end up in the contract are a matter of negotiation between the two contrac-
tual partners, not a matter of international or (generally speaking) of national space law. 
 
4.2.3. Private Operators (Such as Inmarsat) and UK National Space Law 
In contrast to the United States, the United Kingdom and France have single “framework” 
acts dealing ratione materiae with the comprehensive range of space activities, including 
satellite operations. Inmarsat, a body “incorporated under the law of any part of the United 
Kingdom,” not being a launch provider itself has to procure the launches of its satellites 
by launch service providers (whether these are governmental or private), yet under the UK 
Outer Space Act it does indeed require a license for each such activity.122 
The Outer Space Act then also imposes upon the licensee the obligation to “indemnify 
Her Majesty’s government in the United Kingdom against any claims brought against the 
government in respect of damage or loss arising out of activities carried on by him to which 
this Act applies.”123 As for insurance, it is left to the licensing authorities to impose such an 
obligation as well as any limit to it.124 At the policy level it has become standard practice to 
impose such an obligation, with moreover a standard cap on third-party liability insurance 
being applied of (currently) some €60,000,000, some US$80,000,000 at today’s rates.125 
In view of the aforementioned focus of the international liability regime as per the Lia-
bility Convention on the launch for the purposes of determining liability, it may appear 
unlikely that the UK authorities would impose such an insurance requirement for a satel-
lite operator (as opposed to a launch operator) without further ado. 
However, the reference to “procurement” of a launch as itself requiring a license under 
the Act may signify that the procurement of a launch by a private UK company such as 
Inmarsat should be read as procurement of that launch by the United Kingdom itself, mak-
ing that state liable under the Liability Convention in case damage would be caused by the 
satellite thus launched. To be sure, Article I(c) sub (i) of the Liability Convention speaks of 
“a State which . . . procures the launching of a space object”; yet many experts would hold 
the reference to “a state” to include any private company subsumed under that state, in 
line with the general equation by Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty of private activities 
with governmental activities for the purpose of international space law.126 Consequently, 
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Inmarsat may indeed be required under its license to take out insurance, essentially be-
cause the UK authorities do not exclude the possibility that their liability may be called 
upon internationally so as to lead to the obligation to compensate damage caused by an 
Inmarsat satellite. 
 
4.24. Private Operators (Such as Eutelsat) and French National Space Law 
Similarly in France, Eutelsat would be subject to a licensing obligation, as there is no doubt 
that the company qualifies as a “juridical person whose headquarters are located in France 
. . . intending to procure the launching of a space object” in addition to being a “French 
operator intending to command such an object during its journey into space.”127 “Opera-
tor” is defined as “any natural or juridical person carrying out a space operation under its 
responsibility and independently,” whereas the term “space operation” includes “any ac-
tivity consisting . . . of ensuring the commanding of a space object during its journey in 
outer space.”128 
Under Article 4 of the Law on space activities, Eutelsat has to be pronounced financially, 
professionally, and technically healthy by the French authorities in order to have a request 
for a license positively considered. More importantly, it has to “have and maintain, as long 
as it can be held liable pursuant to Article 13 and for the amount set out in Articles 16 and 
17, insurance or another financial guarantee,” which “must cover the risk of having to 
compensate for the damages that could be caused to third parties” up to the relevant 
amount, and must cover inter alia “1° The Government and public bodies; 2° The European 
Space Agency (ESA) and its Member States; 3° The operator and the persons having taken 
part in the production of the space object or in the space operation”—of course each to the 
extent these may be faced with claims for compensation.129 The reference to ESA and its 
member states under 2° takes into account in particular the potential for Arianespace 
launches to lead ESA and/or its member states to become liable,130 whereas the reference 
under 3° covers inter alia product liability at the international level, something not as such 
addressed by the Liability Convention. Interestingly, Article 15 allows operators from 
other member states of the European Union (plus those of the European Economic Area)131 
the same possibility as a French operator to avail itself of the maximum liability arrange-
ments under a license.132 
In view of the quoted reference to Article 13, Article 6 essentially reiterates some of the 
provisions of the Liability Convention regarding absolute versus fault liability as well as 
exoneration. Articles 16 and 17 provide the French authorities with the ability to limit the 
indemnification for damage caused during the launching phase respectively thereafter. 
Finally, Article 14 ensures that the French government, if found liable, will be reim-
bursed by the licensee up to the maximum amount applicable under Articles 16 or 17. In-
terestingly, that assurance not only applies to international liability claims under the 
Liability Convention, but also to such claims under the Outer Space Treaty. This suggests 
that France at least does not wish to exclude the possibility that a third state would like to 
claim not on the basis of the Liability Convention (and therefore effectively also not on the 
basis of Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty)133 but on the basis of Article VI.134 
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Apparently, therefore, the mere conduct of space operations by Eutelsat, without these 
necessarily leading to qualification of France as a “launching state” may, if causing dam-
age, from the French perspective still lead to a claim for compensation, as “reparation” for 
the consequences of “national activities in outer space” attributable under Article VI to 
France. 
Take, for instance, the situation in which Eutelsat would buy a satellite already in orbit 
where it had no involvement whatsoever with the launch thereof (for example, buying a 
satellite from a US competitor that had procured its launch from a US launch service pro-
vider, launching from a US facility on US territory).135 Under its own law, France would 
impose the obligation upon Eutelsat to obtain a license for operating that satellite after 
hand-over, including the obligation to indemnify the French government in “the case of . . . 
damage caused after the launching phase” up to a certain maximum.136 
 
4.2.5. Private Operators as Victims of Damage 
On the “victim-side,” read “claimant-side” of liability, the primary focus of the Liability 
Convention on states was logically reflected in a total absence of jus standi for private op-
erators—at least under the Convention itself. Any claim for damage, even if sustained by 
a private operator (for example, if its satellite would be damaged by fragments of another 
space object), would require a state to take it up. Here, the Convention firstly provides for 
the state of nationality of the operator, secondly (if the aforementioned state choose not to 
assert a claim) the state where the damage was sustained (of course presuming it a differ-
ent state than the first-mentioned), and thirdly (if neither of the aforementioned states has 
chosen to assert a claim) the state whose “permanent residents” had sustained the damage 
(presuming again this to be a state different from the previous one(s)).137 
With a view to juridical persons such as private operators of communication satellites, 
however, the following caveats regarding the application of these clauses are due. As to the 
second option of a state taking up the cause of a private operator, it should be noted that 
the most likely cases of damage being suffered by a private operator as caused by an(other) 
space object (and hence falling within the scope of the Liability Convention) would be to 
its own satellite in outer space, meaning this option essentially becomes useless: outer 
space is not the “territory” of any state in the legal sense of the word.138 
Furthermore, the third option seems to focus largely on natural persons, which is in any 
event where the notion of a “permanent resident,” entitling the state concerned to the ex-
ercise of diplomatic protection such as by taking up an international claim on its behalf, is 
becoming an increasingly accepted concept.139 Even if it were to be applied here to private 
companies as well, the notion of “permanent residence” in the context of a company logi-
cally speaking would point at its main seat of business operations, which is its headquar-
ters (unless a ground station for satellite control as such would be deemed to qualify)—
which in turn, under general public international law, co-determines the nationality of the 
company140 (together with the law of incorporation), bringing analysis back to the first op-
tion. 
In short: it would essentially be the state of nationality which is to take up the cause of 
a private satellite operator in the context of an international liability dispute under the Li-
ability Convention. Questions may then arise to what extent domestic provisions, either 
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by national law or by applicable licenses, deal with the rights and interests of private op-
erators to see their cause being properly taken up by their state of nationality, for example 
by a right to be consulted and/or present at relevant proceedings. The Liability Conven-
tion, being an international public law treaty, remains completely silent on those issues. 
It should be noted that nothing in the Liability Convention precludes a private operator 
from pursuing its own claims in other forums at its disposal, notably those of the launching 
state.141 There may be several valid reasons for doing so: apart from the dependency upon 
a private operator’s state of nationality which recourse to the Liability Convention’s sys-
tem requires, private claims in a court would lead to a binding judgement,142 may cost 
considerably less in terms of time and funds, and may (at least in certain jurisdictions) lead 
to substantially larger amounts of compensation than an international decision. To that 
extent, the Liability Convention is merely an additional tool for relevant states to arrive at 
compensation for damage sustained by themselves and/ or natural or juridical persons. 
 
4.3. The “Boundary” Issue under the Liability Convention 
The Liability Convention, like the Rescue Agreement, defines IGOs essentially in an indi-
rect manner, through its repeated references to states members of that organization and 
their fundamental role in the context of the secondary personality these IGOs can enjoy 
under the Convention. In other words: for the purposes of the Liability Convention the key 
defining factor of an ISO is again its being composed of a number of sovereign states, as 
this already followed from the Outer Space Treaty’s relevant provisions. 
Moreover, there is no proper definition of private operators, but following the Outer 
Space Treaty’s lead clearly Intelsat, Inmarsat, and Eutelsat qualify as such for the purpose 
of the Liability Convention, and will of necessity implicate their respective states in any 
case where damage would be caused by or to their operations. 
Crossing the threshold from ISOs to private companies, therefore, means that hence-
forth Inmarsat requires a license from the UK authorities which, inter alia, deals with the 
potential for the United Kingdom to be held liable as a consequence of Inmarsat’s procure-
ment of launches, and generally speaking ensure control of the respective authorities over 
the technical, operational, economic, social, and ecological quality of the activities.143 
Similarly, Eutelsat would be faced with liability reimbursement arrangements as part 
of its license, as a consequence of the reference of the French Law on space activities to 
compensation possibly due under (Article VI of the) Outer Space Treaty in conjunction 
with its reference to licensing obligations for any operations in space and (limits to) indem-
nification under such a license also for damage caused after the launch phase has ended.144 
Only in the case of Intelsat, as seen, the imposition of international third-party liability 
arrangements through the license (which license itself was suggested by Article VI of the 
Outer Space Treaty and obligatory under the Commercial Space Launch Act) would be 
unlikely.145 Apparently, the US authorities do not consider mere operations of Intelsat in-
volving its satellites and causing damage to possibly give rise to claims for compensation 
as part of reparation for internationally wrongful acts involving such damage under Arti-
cle VI of the Outer Space Treaty. 
Whether the position on this legal matter of the United Kingdom and France or con-
versely that of the United States will prevail and become the generally accepted one at the 
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end of the day will only be decided either when further international legal discussion (pre-
sumably in the UNCOPUOS context) would lead to an unequivocal understanding on the 
scope of the international responsibility and liability of Articles VI and VII of the Outer 
Space Treaty and of the Liability Convention or upon the first decision by an international 
court or tribunal in a concrete legal dispute on the issue. 
Crossing the threshold from ISO to private operator finally also meant that, henceforth, 
all three operators would depend upon their respective states of nationality only in case 
they would suffer damage and would like to use the Liability Convention to get such dam-
age compensated. If, for whatever reason, the United States, the United Kingdom, or 
France would not consider taking up a case under the Liability Convention on behalf of 
Intelsat, Inmarsat, or Eutelsat for damage caused to their respective satellites, the only op-
tion left to those private operators might well be to sue in a private capacity in the courts 
of (presumably) the (or a) launching state.146 
 
5. The Registration Convention and Private Operators 
 
5.1. Intergovernmental Organizations and the Registration Convention 
The Registration Convention, tied most closely to the Liability Convention already in terms 
of substance—the former’s regime for registration of space objects was developed to a large 
extent to enhance the chances of identifying the liable entity or entities for the purposes of 
the latter147—follows the same path when it comes to providing IGOs with their own sta-
tus. Also the Registration Convention was designed largely to elaborate one article of the 
Outer Space Treaty, in this case Article VIII, providing for the general concept of register-
ing a space object and the possibility to exercise jurisdiction over it for the registering 
state.148 
Article VII(1) of the Registration Convention provides for the same three criteria for an 
IGO to become a de facto party to its regime (partisanship of the majority of its members to 
the Registration Convention, partisanship of the majority of its members to the Outer Space 
Treaty, and a formal declaration) as well as for the same limitation to such partisanship of 
the IGO (namely, to the Articles dealing with substantive rights and obligations only).149 
The result of application of the Registration Convention to an IGO having made the 
declaration concerned—which did not apply to INTELSAT, INMARSAT, or EUTELSAT, 
and currently does not apply to ITSO, IMSO, or EUTELSAT IGO—is that such an IGO 
could now officially act as registration entity of its own satellites (or other space objects) in 
conformity with its provisions. At the same time, the inherent limitations to applying the 
registration concept to IGOs becomes apparent in dealing with the major legal conse-
quence of registration: the possibility to exercise jurisdiction, on a quasi-territorial basis as 
it were, over the space object so registered.150 Obviously, an IGO cannot exercise jurisdic-
tion in the sense of public international law, so the question would be who could do so over 
a space object registered by an IGO, as it were in its stead or on its behalf.151 
Here the only clue the Registration Convention provides is that “where there are two or 
more launching States in respect of any such space object, they shall jointly determine 
which one of them shall register the object in accordance with paragraph I of this article, 
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bearing in mind the provisions of article VIII of the [Outer Space] Treaty . . . without prej-
udice to appropriate agreements concluded or to be concluded among the launching States 
on jurisdiction and control over the space object and over any personnel thereof.”152 This 
clause, obviously, is targeted at cases where two or more states qualify as launching states, 
where the main rationale is to preclude as far as possible conflicts of jurisdiction between 
several states. 
A similar scenario however would arise where an IGO qualifies as a “launching state” 
for the purpose of the Registration Convention, since in the absence of any further regula-
tion all member states of that IGO, or at least those that are themselves parties to the Reg-
istration Convention—essentially regardless of whether in addition such states themselves 
would qualify as “launching states”—might claim to exercise jurisdiction over the space 
object registered by “their” IGO. So, it would be appropriate to apply the same rationale, 
as further corroborated by Article XIII of the Outer Space Treaty,153 and hence essentially 
the same principle, in that “appropriate agreements” can or should be concluded among 
the states concerned “on jurisdiction and control over the space object and over any per-
sonnel thereof,” to use the phrases of the Registration Convention.154 Presumably, such 
“appropriate agreements” would be part of the IGO’s internal statutes, or being adopted 
under those. 
Obviously, with none of the three IGOs currently under consideration either in their old 
or in their new manifestation having declared their acceptance of the rights and obligations 
under the Convention, all this has so far remained theory. 
 
5.2. Private Operators and the Registration Convention 
As for Intelsat, Inmarsat, and Eutelsat, the main point of note is that the registration of 
satellites launched for either of them under the Registration Convention is not (necessarily 
or automatically) for respectively the United States, the United Kingdom, and France to 
undertake; that almost exclusively depends upon what extent these three states qualify as 
“launching states” for those satellites. 
This would unequivocally be the case, for example, for the United States if an Intelsat 
satellite would be launched from a US launch site or territory, or by NASA or the US Air 
Force.155 If, by contrast, that satellite would be launched by a Soyuz vehicle from Bajkonour, 
the only legal link between the Intelsat-owned and -operated satellite and the United States 
would be Intelsat’s nationality as per its administrative and operational headquarters—a 
concept which does not figure as such in the definition of the launching state. 
There would be one scenario however in this example under which the United States 
might still play the role of state of registry under the Registration Convention by qualifying 
as a “launching state.” This depends on the extent to which the second criterion for becom-
ing a launching state, that of “procuring” the launch, is interpreted as including cases 
where a state’s national (for instance a company with its nationality) procures the launch 
itself, as opposed to only dealing with cases where “A State . . . procures the launching of 
a space object.”156 As there is no general agreement on the international level regarding the 
precise scope of the notion of “procurement,” not even among individual experts,157 states 
have picked their own choice as to such interpretation, even if largely “unconsciously,” by 
applying their respective licensing obligation and requirements regarding liability—where 
V O N  D E R  D U N K ,  C R O S S I N G  A  R U B Y C O N ?  (2 0 1 3 )  
22 
the concept of the “launching state” was first developed—and registration to one or the 
other category of private actors. 
Starting again with the example of Intelsat, the United States under the Commercial 
Space Launch Act does not require a license with the attendant reimbursement and insur-
ance obligations as discussed158 for operators procuring a launch on a non-US launcher 
from non-US soil, whereas the Communications Act’s licensing system only refers to those 
intending to “use or operate any apparatus for the transmission of energy or communica-
tions or signals by radio” on US territory—yet does not contain any relevant liability or 
insurance requirements. From this, it should be deduced that the United States at least 
implicitly does not consider itself a “launching state” for the purpose of either Liability or 
Registration Convention on the mere premise of a private operator with its nationality pro-
curing the launch in question. At least, it would find a strong argument in denying any 
liability or obligation to register in respect of such satellite should a legal dispute on this 
ever come to an international court, tribunal, or Claims Commission.159 
It should be added, that in the United States there is no statutory registration of space 
objects which might shed further light on this issue. So far, the State Department takes care 
of such registration as necessary, based on information provided by other branches of the 
US government and referring in this context to “the official U.S. Registry of Space Objects 
Launched into Outer Space.”160 The Federal Aviation Administration in turn is then re-
quired to assist the State Department in ensuring licensees will provide the appropriate 
information, which applies to “all objects placed in space by a licensed launch.”161 
Interestingly, for Inmarsat as a UK company the situation is different, as the UK Outer 
Space Act does require an operator with UK nationality procuring a launch to obtain a li-
cense, and this cannot but lead to the conclusion that the United Kingdom would consider 
itself a “launching state,” and would feel itself obliged either to register the satellite at issue 
itself (in case the United Kingdom would be the only state qualifying as “launching state”) 
or to make sure some state does so in conjunction with other launching states, in case it is 
not itself the only one qualifying as such—for example, if the actual launch of the satellite 
would be undertaken by a Soyuz from the Russian facilities at Bajkonour.162 
The UK Outer Space Act also specifically provides that “[t]he Secretary of State shall 
maintain a register of space objects” and that “[t]here shall be entered in the register such 
particulars of such space objects as the Secretary of State considers appropriate to comply 
with the international obligations of the United Kingdom,” thus leaving the matter essen-
tially undecided to what categories of private satellite operators that Convention would 
actually apply.163 
In the case of Eutelsat, the French national space law likewise calls for a license for those 
operators of French nationality that wish to procure a launch and/or operate a satellite 
launched elsewhere. Yet, as the law on space activities also specifically refers not only to 
the Liability Convention but also to the Outer Space Treaty, the need for a license in the 
scenarios referred to may not be concluded automatically to confirm France’s perception 
of being liable—to the extent the licensing obligation would be following from Article VI 
of the Outer Space Treaty, it would rather qualify France as a responsible state. 
It should nevertheless be assumed that the French law does not deviate more than 
strictly necessary from the terms of the Liability and Registration Conventions, to both of 
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which France is a party of long standing.164 Therefore, it should also be assumed that those 
cases for a license obligation that match the criterion of a launching state for liability pur-
poses will be those used in the Liability Convention—and hence be identical to those of 
the Registration Convention.165 
On registration itself finally, the French law simply calls for registration “in the event 
France has a registration obligation according to Article II” of the Registration Convention, 
without specifying or indicating how France itself envisions the scope of that Article with 
a view, for example, to private satellites and/or the operations conducted with them.166 
 
5.3. The “Boundary” Issue under the Registration Convention 
As a consequence of the above, the transition from ISO to private operator has had varying 
consequences as far as the Registration Convention is concerned. In the ISO context regis-
tration of satellites was rather straightforward, any member state being able to register on 
behalf of the ISO as being a state “procuring” the launch of that satellite through the “ve-
hicle” of the ISO.167 Following the transition, however, for Inmarsat and Eutelsat the situa-
tion became even more straightforward, with the United Kingdom considering itself to be 
a “launching state” for any satellite the launch of which was procured by Inmarsat, and 
hence tasked to ensure proper registration, and the same applying mutatis mutandis to 
France and Eutelsat; whereas in the case of Intelsat the state or states entitled and obliged 
to realize registration might more readily differ from case to case and might not even nec-
essarily include the United States. 
 
6. UNGA Resolution 37/92 and Private Operators 
 
6.1. Intergovernmental Organizations and the UNGA Resolution 
The UN Resolution dealing with international direct television broadcasting,168 being a 
Resolution of the UN General Assembly, is not a binding legal document akin to a treaty.169 
Also, the fact that it was not adopted by consensus but by a vote with most of the states of 
the developed world abstaining or voting against it denies the Resolution the status as 
being reflective of customary international law—with the exception perhaps of those states 
that voted in favor.170 Thus, the substantive core of the Resolution, the perceived require-
ment of “prior consent,” does not generally speaking apply to Intelsat, Inmarsat, and Eu-
telsat, the post-ISO-privatization operators, since neither the United States, nor the United 
Kingdom, nor France, the respective host states of those privatized entities, are among the 
states voting in favor of the Resolution.171 
The UN Resolution makes reference to intergovernmental organizations exactly once, 
in stating that “[w]hen international direct television broadcasting by satellite is carried 
out by an international intergovernmental organisation, the responsibility referred to in 
paragraph 8 above should be borne both by that organisation and by the States participat-
ing in it.”172 Paragraph 8 in turn, as will be seen, simply restates the general state responsi-
bility for space activities as already posited by Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty for the 
specific context concerned. 
As the Resolution also explicitly considers the activities it deals with to be subject to the 
Outer Space Treaty,173 these paragraphs simply confirm the ultimate responsibility of UN 
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member states for compliance with the Resolution’s principles in cases where intergovern-
mental organizations that those states are members of undertake the broadcasting activi-
ties at issue. This, of course, would only be the case to the extent those principles can be 
considered binding for any individual state concerned, either because it has voted in favor 
or because a certain obligation could be considered to reflect customary international law 
(or both). Further analysis might be required as regards the question whether that would 
actually apply to (a majority) of the member states of ITSO, IMSO, and/or EUTELSAT IGO. 
 
6.2. Private Operators and UNGA Resolution37/92 
The key provision in the Resolution regarding private operators is to be found in the afore-
mentioned Paragraph 8, stating that “States should bear international responsibility for 
activities in the field of international direct television broadcasting by satellite carried out 
by them or under their jurisdiction and for the conformity of any such activities with the 
principles set forth in this document.”174 
Thus representing a specific application of the general state responsibility principle of 
Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty, the activities of any operator under the jurisdiction of 
a state should trigger the responsibility of that state just as if it concerned its own activities. 
The main difference with the formulation of Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty from that 
perspective lies in the use of the “classic” international law-phrase “under the jurisdiction” 
instead of the reference to “national activities” that Article VI uses. Thus, the formulation 
of Paragraph 8 seems more clear in that this would normally refer to both territorial juris-
diction and jurisdiction over nationals.175 
In the specific cases of Intelsat, Inmarsat, and Eutelsat, there should be little doubt that 
(at least) the United States, the United Kingdom and France respectively are internation-
ally responsible for their activities with a view to the Resolution’s terms. Since, however, 
as indicated, neither of these three states have voted in favor of the Resolution when it was 
enunciated in 1982, nor have they ever since given evidence of a change of legal views in 
this regard, the three private satellite operators currently under scrutiny would only have 
to comply with those principles pronounced by the UN Resolution which would reflect 
customary international law or would otherwise be binding upon them.176 
 
6.3. The “Boundary” Issue under UNGA Resolution 37/92 
In view of the above, the transition from ISOs to private operators operating under a lim-
ited supervision regime of revamped IGOs did not give rise to a major difference with 
regard to the legal obligations resting upon, or legal rights bestowed upon, the entities in 
question. At most it could be said at this point that the former operational ISOs would 
more likely have been required to operate in conformity with all the principles through-
out—but essentially for political reasons: because a major portion of member states would 
have voted themselves in favor of the Resolution and would be willing to impose the con-
sequences of strictly abiding by its terms as if it concerned a binding treaty, in many in-
stances it would have been practically impossible for the ISOs to overstep those terms. 
The general lack of willingness on the part of the United States, United Kingdom, and 
France to consider the principles (or at least some of them) valid legal rules, by contrast, 
V O N  D E R  D U N K ,  C R O S S I N G  A  R U B Y C O N ?  (2 0 1 3 )  
25 
might have led to the privatized operators being much less likely to be held to the princi-
ples provided by the Resolution. The final answer to that issue, however, would require 
an analysis of the respective licenses, where the authorities concerned would (or at least 
should) have taken care to somehow reflect those principles they would consider binding 
(as a matter of customary law) whilst omitting any of those they would not consider valid 
legal rules. 
It may be noted finally that the various legal documents allowing the respective super-
visory IGOs to force compliance of the private operators do not even explicitly refer to 
international law, only to the core respectively basic principles which the operators should 
comply with,177 which essentially begs the question again to what extent there would be 
customary international law rules incorporated in the Resolution which ipso facto would 
be applicable also to the activities of the operators. 
 
7. The ITU Framework and Private Operators 
 
7.1. The ITU Framework and Satellite Operators 
The framework regime, based upon the ITU Constitution and ITU Convention, using the 
ITU with its competencies and capacities as the principal instrument to deal with the most 
important aspects of international telecommunications, is—of course—by far the most im-
portant element of the international legal environment for conducting satellite communica-
tions, whether by way of hybrid public consortia such as the old INTELSAT, INMARSAT, 
or EUTELSAT, or through privatized operators such as Intelsat, Inmarsat, and Eutelsat, to 
the extent supervised by the new IGOs ITSO, IMSO, and EUTELSAT IGO. 
The present chapter does not profess to treat any part of that subject in any detail, but 
merely represents an effort to highlight one particular element thereof.178 As indicated, the 
focus here is namely on the principled legal differences between intergovernmental organ-
izations and private operators, and an analysis of the international space law treaties (and 
the one UN Resolution dedicated to satellite communications) on this particular issue 
without at least a summary comparative look at the ITU framework would make little 
sense. 
 
7.2. Intergovernmental Organizations, Private Operators, and the ITU Framework 
For the above purpose, it suffices to revisit the key mechanism for dealing with potential 
problems of satellite communications in the international environment, which is that of the 
coordination of frequencies and, indirectly, orbits.179 The ITU framework, developed in its 
most original version almost a century and a half ago, for a long time has remained even 
more exclusively state-oriented than the UN space treaties, and this also transpires funda-
mentally in the aforementioned coordination process. 
When states are intent on operating a satellite and on assuring the communication op-
erations of that satellite, the process of coordination essentially consists of two steps. The 
first step involves the allocation of frequency bands to categories of communications ser-
vices—or in the language of the Radio Regulations: “allocation (of a frequency band): Entry 
in the Table of Frequency Allocations of a given frequency band for the purpose of its use 
by one or more terrestrial or space radio communication services or the radio astronomy 
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service under specified conditions. This term shall also be applied to the frequency band 
concerned.”180 These allocations normally take place at the World Radio Conferences 
which are regularly held every two or three years, where the ITU member states collec-
tively decide on new allocations, or changes or deletions of existing allocations, based on 
the perceived global and general need of specific services (satellite as well as non-satellite) 
to be able to use radiofrequencies for their services—and of course on their lobbying and 
negotiating skills.181 
Once a frequency band is allocated to a certain category of satellite services, it is open 
for specific requests by individual states to be granted interference-free use of specific fre-
quencies for uplink, downlink, and wherever applicable, inter-satellite-link purposes. 
Those individual requests can be forwarded to the ITU’s Radio Regulations Board182 at any 
moment a state has decided to go forward with a specific satellite project, the so-called 
“notification.” Notification then kicks off an elaborate and often quite prolonged coordi-
nation process in order to ascertain that the new proposed satellite operation will not risk 
interfering with existing or previously notified requests for frequencies.183 
The ultimate aim of the notification and coordination process is to arrive at the second 
step, the allotment of specific frequencies to the particular notified service, also in case of sat-
ellite services—or to use the language of the Radio Regulations again: “allotment (of a ra-
dio frequency or radio frequency channel): Entry of a designated frequency channel in an 
agreed plan, adopted by a competent conference, for use by one or more administrations 
for a terrestrial or space radiocommunication service in one or more identified countries 
or geographical areas and under specified conditions.”184 
The reference to “administrations” as the entities entitled to the use of an allotted fre-
quency (and therefore also the ones entitled to request allotment) is critical, since this term 
refers exclusively to relevant state organs: an administration is defined as “any governmen-
tal department or service responsible for discharging the obligations undertaken in the Constitu-
tion of the International Telecommunication Union, in the Convention of the International 
Telecommunication Union and in the Administrative Regulations.”185 
Thus, neither intergovernmental organizations nor private operators have any formal 
independent say in either the allocation process or the allotment process, or can even re-
quest for allotment at the ITU level. Both essentially are treated equal in this respect, in 
that a third step, of assignment, becomes necessary. “Assignment” is defined as “authori-
sation given by an administration for a radio station to use a radio frequency or radio fre-
quency channel under specified conditions,”186 formally speaking following the allotment 
of that frequency to the state whose administration is referenced. 
As such, both ISOs and private satellite operators require one state firstly to go through 
the allotment process, and, where necessary prior to that, the allocation process, and sec-
ondly to then assign the frequencies ultimately so allotted to them in order to be able to 
use them under the ITU system. 
The omission of intergovernmental or private operators from the key formal decision-
making processes within the ITU was not an oversight or neglected relic. ITU member 
states are explicitly held internationally responsible for telecommunication activities by 
entities “authorised by them to establish and operate telecommunications and which en-
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gage in international services or which operate stations capable of causing harmful inter-
ference to the radio services of other countries.”187 This provision literally refers to “oper-
ating agencies,” so as to include both public and private operators, to the extent the former 
are not yet covered by the same obligation of Article 6(1), applicable to the member states 
themselves. An “operating agency” is defined in the Annex to the ITU Constitution as 
“[a]ny individual, company, corporation or governmental agency,” and should for the pre-
sent analysis be read as including an “international (multi) government agency.”188 
While in more recent times the limited status of non-states in the ITU has started to 
evolve—for example, at the Kyoto Conference of 1994 by means of an amendment to the 
ITU Convention the possibility for nongovernmental entities to participate as “small-m” 
members was allowed, providing them with the right of access to all relevant information 
as well as consultation; and at the Minneapolis Plenipotentiary Conference of 1998 they 
were allowed to achieve a status of “Sector members,” allowing for full-blown participa-
tion at the ITU sector level189—states remain the only full members of the organization 
represented on the Council, the highest decision-making body of the ITU.190 
 
7.3. The “Boundary” Issue under the ITU Framework, as Far as Frequency Notification 
and Coordination Is Concerned 
The only distinction between ISOs and private satellite operators in terms of obtaining a 
nominal guarantee of interference-free usage of usable frequencies from the ITU lies in the 
fact that, for IGOs, any member state of that IGO could propose allocation of frequency 
bands if needed and request allotment of specific frequencies effectively on behalf of that 
IGO. For a private operator there could usually be only one administration undertaking 
those efforts: that of the state of nationality (that is, incorporation and headquarters) of the 
company concemed.191 
In practice, not even that distinction may have mattered much. In the cases of the old 
INTELSAT, INMARSAT, and EUTELSAT, for obvious reasons of efficiency and coherence, 
the task of taking up the interests of these IGOs in the ITU context was delegated to the 
host state of the organization—the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, respec-
tively, precisely the states that post-privatization would continue to do the same on behalf 
of respectively Intelsat, Inmarsat, and Eutelsat. Even the inherent support including, where 
necessary, votes in favor of the other member states of INTELSAT, INMARSAT, and EU-
TELSAT in the ITU decision making processes, for respective US, UK, or French efforts 
would normally not be lacking in the case of the private operators due to the existence of 
ITSO, IMSO, and EUTELSAT IGO, respectively, whose member states should still be gen-
erally interested in seeing the private operators succeed. 
 
8. Concluding Remarks 
 
Perhaps surprisingly, the overall conclusions regarding the privatization process under 
the four space treaties, the UN Resolution, and the ITU regime are that the specific conse-
quences of transformation from an intergovernmental organization to a private operator 
summarily supervised by a scaled-down intergovernmental overseer are actually rela-
tively marginal, and often more of a formal nature or leading to practical differences of 
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handling the various interests involved than that there is any fundamental legal paradigm-
shift to be noted. 
In the final analysis, however, there is more to it than that. It is true, that even under the 
four space treaties, the apparent recognition of IGOs as a special type of entity, upon closer 
analysis, did not provide them much of a legal status and role as independent from their 
member states. Ultimately, states would always remain responsible and liable under the 
Outer Space Treaty and Liability Convention for activities of ISOs in case first-option deal-
ings with the ISOs directly would somehow not work out to the satisfaction of the third 
parties invoking such responsibility or liability. Still, at least a considerable incentive was 
provided to prearrange internally for procedures of handling ISO liabilities—in terms of 
general need, similar, but in terms of structure, scope, and substance quite different from 
the incentive for states to draft national space legislation including licensing regimes han-
dling private operator liabilities. 
For example, global public interests in satellite communications would be much more 
likely to be ignored or neglected in a context where a single state would determine the 
legal parameters for an operator’s activities than in a context where a multiplicity of states 
would be involved in determining that framework. Conversely, the latter would have been 
much less likely to adapt to a rapidly changing technological, economic and social envi-
ronment. 
Also the seemingly independent ability to register satellites under the Registration Con-
vention as an ISO—an option, it should be added, never used by INTELSAT, INMARSAT, 
EUTELSAT, ITSO, IMSO, or EUTELSAT IGO—would still require the member states of 
such organization to take care of the most prominent consequence of registration of a space 
object: the direct entitlement under Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty and the Regis-
tration Convention to exercise jurisdiction and control over the satellite at issue. In that 
sense, the reality of the state-orientation of the space treaties as to a large extent still being 
devolved from general international public law, could not be overcome by the space trea-
ties on their own account. 
As a result, ISOs in the formal legal sense were (almost) as dependent on their member 
states as private space operators were on “their” state. In both cases it is such a state, after 
all, which is to be held responsible and liable under key provisions of, in particular, the 
Outer Space Treaty and the Liability Convention. 
UN Resolution 37/92 and the element of the ITU framework discussed here do not even 
make that much of a theoretical distinction between an intergovernmental and a private 
operator, hence making the difference between the pre-privatization and post-privatization 
at least in terms of structural, formal, and theoretical application once more largely negli-
gible. 
The major exception worthy of note might operate more at an overarching abstract level 
of legal development than at the level of the operators themselves. The aforementioned 
“explicitization” of the general public duties for the privatized satellite operators by means 
of Public Service Agreements as noted constitutes an important measure of “juridification” 
of the operations of satellite operators, the consequence of the cross-over from ISO to pri-
vate operator. This has equivalents in other areas as well—for example, to comply with the 
requirements of the Registration Convention, the registration of satellites now requires a 
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formalized domestic legal process instead of a political decision taken within an IGO struc-
ture, and essentially the same applies to the handling of the potential liabilities resulting 
from their operations under the Liability Convention in terms of now-explicit obligations 
to arrange appropriate insurance. 
This in turn may lead to increasing diversification, as for example Eutelsat is being sub-
jected to registration requirements even beyond the ones provided in the Registration Con-
vention, and all three private operators are handled differently when it comes to dealing 
with the domestic consequences of liability under the Liability Convention. Prior to pri-
vatization, the ISOs operated more or less directly under the aegis of the Liability Conven-
tion, even if INTELSAT and INMARSAT had not made a declaration under Article XXII 
and also the declaration of EUTELSAT did not cause it to obtain much of a status inde-
pendent from its member states. Through those member states, liability applied in accord-
ance to the terms of the Liability Convention without further ado except for those formal 
jus standi issues. Following privatization, however, with the intermittence of domestic laws 
to regulate the specific liabilities of the operators, licenses could be mandated for varying 
activities (such as procurement in the UK case), liabilities could become limited, insurance 
could be made obligatory and specific obligations could be established which had never 
been considered under the Liability Convention (such as in the French case with product 
liability). 
From a different angle therefore, a major result of the privatization of the ISOs was a 
fragmentation and diversification of the legal framework(s) within which they had to op-
erate. Further to this, and partly as a consequence thereof, the main differences between 
pre-privatization and post-privatization will lie in the application in practice, both admin-
istratively speaking and politically speaking, of the legal regimes discussed. 
In the international arena, the private operators will have to count on their host states 
to a much greater extent than the ISOs used to do, for even if they still could avail them-
selves of support from ITSO, IMSO, or EUTELSAT IGO, these IGOs obviously have only a 
specific and limited interest in the operators’ activities, resulting in limited responsibilities 
and even more limited liabilities. After all, the whole idea behind the privatization process 
was that, apart from some public duties which should remain guaranteed, the operators 
should act under as much commercial freedom as possible, meaning that the new IGOs 
might be less broadly and actively interested in the success of the particular operator they 
were supervising. Consequently, private operators have to look to their national authori-
ties for issues of recovery of damages under the Liability Convention or for satellites to be 
recovered under the Rescue Agreement, which thereby becomes a matter of national law. 
This opens the door to diversification of applicable regimes, unless the inherent global 
character of the satellite communications market serves as a force promoting international 
harmonization. 
In the last resort, therefore, the Rubycon crossed by the privatization of the ISOs indeed 
was more of a practical, economic, and political character than of a strictly speaking legal 
character, although the legal framework did—apart from reflecting the relevant practical, 
economic, and political paradigm changes—result in a juridification of the regimes and in 
considerably more precision regarding the allocation of responsibilities and liabilities. 
Also, as a consequence of the fact that the Rubycon was crossed, so to speak, at different 
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fords by INTELSAT, INMARSAT, and EUTELSAT, the general legal framework was seen 
to diversify and fragment considerably. From that perspective there is no doubt that also 
legally speaking the world of international satellite communications has changed pro-
foundly following the privatization of these three ISOs. 
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